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ESSAYS
AFRICAN-AMERICAN STUDENT-
ATHLETES: MARGINALIZING THE
NCAA REGULATORY STRUCTURE?
TIMoTHY DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The regulatory scheme of the National Collegiate Athletic Associa-
tion (NCAA) has been criticized for failing to comport with the present
day realities that propel intercollegiate athletics.' In addition, key val-
ues-amateurism and educational primacy-that underlie the rules and
regulations that are central to the NCAA's regulatory structure have
been subjected to harsh criticism.2 Moreover, NCAA rules are increas-
ingly assailed as racially and culturally insensitive to ethnic minorities
This essay examines allegations that NCAA rules, while facially neu-
tral, disparately impact African-American student-athletes. It begins
with an overview of the NCAA regulatory scheme and the principles on
which it is premised. Next, it identifies the NCAA rules and regulations
most often criticized as disproportionately and adversely impacting the
interests of African-American student-athletes. In this regard, the essay
examines the impact on African-American student-athletes of rules reg-
ulating initial eligibility and financial benefits for athletic related
activities.
The essay proposes that rules imposing financial restrictions fail to
comport with the economic and social realities that confront many stu-
dent-athletes, particularly African-Americans. I argue that the disso-
nance between such realities and NCAA rules converge with the
commercialism in college sport to undermine the legitimacy of the
NCAA regulatory scheme. The marginalization of this regulatory system
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law. The author
gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Mark Valencia and Virgil Jordan.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 106-116.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 19-24.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 26-66.
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manifests most saliently in the creation of an underground economy in
intercollegiate athletics. The essay concludes with a discussion of the
consequences for African-American student-athletes of their participa-
tion in this underground economy and the resultant undermining of
NCAA rules and regulations.
II. THE NCAA REGULATORY SCHEME
The NCAA is a nonprofit voluntary association consisting of approx-
imately 900 four-year colleges and universities.4 Adopting the notion of
institutional control, the NCAA Constitution places responsibility on its
member institutions for compliance with the "rules and regulations of
the Association."5 Accordingly, a significant function of the NCAA is
the promulgation of the rules and principles with which its member insti-
tutions must comply.6
Moreover, it is through the NCAA's rule-making and enforcement
processes7 that the Association articulates adherence to values long per-
ceived as fundamental to intercollegiate athletics: educational primacy
and amateurism. The articulated primacy of the education and amateur-
ism values are succinctly stated in the NCAA's statement of its primary
purpose: "to maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the
educational program and the athlete as an integral part of the student
body and by so doing, retain a clear line of demarcation between inter-
collegiate athletics and professional sports."s
4. NCAA MINORITY OPPORTUNITY AND INTERESTS COMM., FOUR YEAR STUDY OF
RACE DEMOGRAPHICS OF MEMBER INSTITUTIONS 1 (1994).
5. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL arts. 2.1.1
& 6.01.1 [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL]. Article 6 of the NCAA Constitution expresses the
concept of institutional control as follows: "The control and responsibility for the conduct of
intercollegiate athletics shall be exercised by the institution itself and by the conference(s), if
any, of which it is a member." Id. at art. 6.01.1.
6. These rules and regulations are adopted by the NCAA at its annual meeting. NCAA
MANUAL art. 5.1.1.1.
Indeed it is through the rule making process that the NCAA sets national standards for the
governance of intercollegiate athletics. "Timothy Davis, A Model of Institutional Governance
for Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 599, 600. See Brian Porto, Balancing Due Pro-
cess and Academic Integrity in Intercollegiate Athletics: The Scholarship Athlete's Limited
Property Interest in Eligibility, 62 IND. LJ. 1151, 1174 (1987) (describing the NCAA as the
primary regulator of intercollegiate athletics).
7. Another critical function is the investigation and prosecution of alleged rules viola-
tions. Jaffe D. Dickerson & Mayer Chapman, Contract Law, Due Process, and the NCAA, 5
J.C. & U.L. 107, 109 (1978). Because it also determines sanctions, the NCAA has been char-
acterized as "a hybrid of legislative, executive, and judicial bodies." Id.
8. NCAA MANUAL arts. 1.1.3. Other basic purposes of the NCAA include the promotion
of competitive equity between its member institutions and the promotion of the economic
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More specifically, the amateurism principle is described as follows:
"Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport.... Stu-
dent participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and stu-
dent-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and
commercial enterprises." 9 NCAA Bylaws enumerate the requirements
with which a student-athlete must comply in order to retain amateur sta-
tus. For example, student-athletes are prohibited from accepting pay for
use of their athletic abilities,10 retaining agents," and entering into a
professional draft. 2
With respect to educational value, the NCAA considers intercollegi-
ate athletics programs as vital components of the university's educa-
tional program.' 3  Thus, the NCAA Constitution provides that
"[i]ntercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner
designed to protect and enhance the physical and educational welfare of
student-athletes."' 4 Through this and other provisions, the "NCAA pro-
fesses to adhere closely to academic or educational values in the govern-
ance of intercollegiate athletics, including big-time, revenue producing
sports at the collegiate level.""5 Rules reflecting the educational value
include those regulating initial eligibility,' 6 limiting the numbers of hours
well-being of its member institutions. Andrew K. Craig, The National Collegiate Athletic As-
sociation's No Agent and No Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate Sports are Forcing
Change, 4 SmrON HALL J. SPORT L. 483,486 (1994). Rules specifically designed to maintain a
level playing field between institutions include those that preclude a student-athlete from em-
ploying an agent and from entering a professional draft. Id. The NCAA Constitution identi-
fies rules regulating recruiting and eligibility as designed in part to promote equity among
member institutions. NCAA MANUAL arts. 2.10 & 2.11.
9. NCAA MANUAL art. 2.7.
10. NCAA MANUAL arts. 12.1.1(a) & 12.1.2.
11. Id. at art. 12.1.1(f).
12. Id.
13. Section 2.4 of the NCAA Constitution provides:
THE PRINCIPLE OF SOUND ACADEMIC STANDARDS. Intercollegiate athletics
programs shall be maintained as a vital component of the educational program and
student-athletes shall be an integral part of the student body. The admission, academic
standing and academic progress of student-athletes shall be consistent with the policies
and standards adopted by the institution for the student body in general.
NCAA MANUAL art. 2.4.
14. NCAA MANUAL art. 2.2.
15. Rodney K. Smith, An Academic Game Plan for Reforming Big-Time Intercollegiate
Athletics, 67 DENY. U. L. REv. 213, 217 (1990).
16. Article 14 of the NCAA Manual establishes the academic requirements with which
student-athletes must comply in order to participate in intercollegiate athletic competition.
NCAA MANUAL art. 14. Freshman eligibility requirements are included within these rules.
Id. at art. 14.3.1.
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per week that student-athletes can devote to athletic participation, 17 and
establishing satisfactory progress requirements. 8
Critics question the legitimacy of the education and amateurism val-
ues as providing justification for NCAA rules in the context of big-time 19
intercollegiate athletics.2 0 Moreover, the effectiveness of NCAA rules in
enhancing these values has been fiercely debated. For instance, one
commentator has argued that the primary purpose of adherence to the
amateurism value is to provide a justification for institutions refusing to
share with student-athletes the revenues generated by participation in
Division I-A football and men's basketball-the most prominent reve-
nue-producing sports 1.2  Noted one commentator, "[c]ritics of these reg-
ulations point out that the member universities that run the NCAA have
perverse incentives when it comes to considering the effect the regula-
tions have on student-athletes, since the universities themselves derive a
direct financial benefit from limiting student-athlete compensation and
restricting mobility." In addition, critics question whether rules ade-
quately promote the value of education primacy, particularly given the
17. Student-athlete participation in athletic related activities cannot exceed 4 hours per
day or 20 hours per week. Id. at art. 17.1.5.1.
18. Id. at art. 14.4.1.
19. Big-time intercollegiate sports typically is defined as consisting of Division I-A foot-
ball and Division I men's basketball, the primary revenue producing sports. Rodney K. Smith,
Little Ado About Something: Playing Games with Reform of Big-Time Intercollegiate Athletics,
20 CAP. U. L. REv. 567, 569 n.5 (1991).
20. The notion of amateurism has been described as anachronistic. "[lit is a throwback to
an era when only the leisure classes had the time and wherewithal and were permitted to
participate in athletics." Smith, supra note 15, at 225 n. 54; Sharon E. Rush, Touchdowns,
Toddlers, and Taboos: On Paying College Athletics and Surrogate Contract Mothers, 31 ApIz.
L. REv. 549, 551-52 (1989); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Legislation for the Glory of Sport. Ama-
teurism and Compensation, 1 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7 (1991) (arguing that the Greek ideal
of amateurism on which NCAA rules are based is a myth).
One sports agent described the NCAA's professed principle of amateurism as a mecha-
nism that "artificially [protects] the profit structure of [big time college sports]." D. STANLEY
ErrZEN & GEORGE H. SAGE, SOCIOLOGY OF NORTH AMERICAN SPORT 138 (5th ed. 1993)
(quoting Mike Trope).
21. David A. Skeel, Some Corporate and Securities Law Perspectives on Student-Athletes
and the NCAA, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 669, 670; Rodney K. Smith, supra note 15, at 224. Craig,
supra note 8, at 515 (describing as tenuous the justifications for NCAA no-draft and no-agent
rules based on the principles of educational primacy, amateurism, and competitive equity
given the commercial nature of college athletics and the NCAA); WALTER BYERS, UN-
SPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCr: EXPLOITING COLLEGE ATHLETES 376 (1995) (describing college
amateurism as "economic camouflage for monopoly practice"); Note, Sherman Act Invalida-
tion of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1299 (1992) (reaching the same
conclusion); See EITZEN & SAGE, supra note 20, at 129-30 (providing illustrations to support
their conclusion that "college athletics are not amateur athletics").
22. Skeel, supra note 21, at 670.
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failure of many institutions to provide their student-athletes with an op-
portunity to derive substantively valuable benefits.23 Indeed, emphasiz-
ing the development of successful athletics programs may cause
institutions to pay insufficient attention to the education student-athletes
receive during their college careers.24
The conflict residing in the NCAA's stated goals of educational pri-
macy and amateurism and its role as an economic regulator underlies the
problems that give rise to such criticisms. At the base of this conflict is
the commercialization of college sport.' Ultimately, these criticisms fo-
cus on the extent to which NCAA rules and regulations promote the
principles on which they derive their justification. This, in turn, raises
questions regarding the legitimacy of the NCAA's regulatory system.
III. NCAA RULES: RACIALLY AND CULTURALLY INSENSITIVE?
In discussing NCAA legislation that raised academic standards, a
sports columnist recently wrote, "the Presidents Commission is continu-
ing down a path that creates rules in a vacuum, harming economically
disadvantaged and academically at-risk student-athletes.... [T]here has
to be responsible insight involved, not knee-jerk surface reform."26 This
statement reflects the sentiment of many, including organizations such as
the Black Coaches Association (BCA)27 and the Rainbow Commission
on Fairness in Athletics,28 that have focused attention on the racial im-
pact of NCAA rules and regulations.
23. John R. Allison, Rule-Making Accuracy in the NCAA and its Member Institutions: Do
Their Decisional Structures and Processes Promote Educational Primacy for the Student-Ath-
lete?, 44 KAN. L. REv. 1, 6,56 (1995). See generally ErIZEN & SAGE, supra note 17, at 134-35
(arguing that in the context of college sports, the pursuit of education is subordinated to the
pursuit of economic interests); Timothy Davis, Intercollegiate Athletics: Competing Models
and Conflicting Realities, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 269 (1994); Robert N. Davis, Athletic Reform: Miss-
ing the Bases in University Athletics, 20 CAP. U.L. REv. 597 (1991); Smith, supra note 19, at
568.
24. Skeel, supra note 21, at 670.
25. See Christopher L. Chin, Note, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of
the Student-Athlete, 26 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1213, 1216-17 (1993); NAND HART-NIBBRIG &
CLEMENT CO1-rINGHAM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLLEGE SPORTS 15 (1986) (conclud-
ing that college sports currently rests on values, such as commercialism, which depart funda-
mentally from the amateurism principle).
26. Bryan Burwell, After String of Setbacks at Convention, Protest Forces Cast an Eye
Toward Courts, USA TODAY, Jan. 5, 1996, at 6C.
27. The BCA is comprised of approximately 3,000 African-American high school and col-
lege athletic coaches. Debra E. Blum, Eyes on the Prize, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 13,
1994, at A33, A34.
28. The Rainbow Commission on Fairness in Athletics is a group organized by the Rev.
Jessie Jackson. Debra E. Blum, Black in Sports; Freshman Eligibility; NCAA Restructuring,
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The BCA has assailed limited African-American involvement in the
NCAA's rule-making process, the disproportionate impact of certain
rules on African-American students, and African-Americans' access, to
coaching opportunities.2 9 The BCA drew attention to these issues in
1993 by threatening to mount a series of protest activities, including a
possible coaches' and players' boycott of basketball games.3 ° The
threatened boycott was forestalled by behind the scenes negotiations. 31
Nevertheless, the BCA's activities heightened awareness of racial inequi-
ties in college sport.32
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 7, 1995, at A38. In 1994, it developed a seven point plan for
increasing racial diversity at NCAA institutions. Key components of the plan included: devel-
oping affirmative action plans to increase the numbers of minorities and women in sports
administrative positions; increasing the number of minority student-athletes in nonrevenue
sports; developing programs that will provide life-skills for student-athletes; and developing
and implementing diversity training by institutions for athletic administrators and coaches.
Rainbow Coalition Develops Diversity Plan for Institutions, NCAA NEws, Nov. 7, 1994, at 1,
20.
29. Steve Berkowitz, Black Coaches' Group to Boycott Issues Forum, WASH. PosT, Oct.
13, 1993, at Fl.
30. Steve Wieberg, NCAA Move Doesn't Deter Black Coaches, USA TODAY, Oct. 21,
1993, at 7C. The threatened boycott, which was characterized as "Black Saturday," would
have urged players and coaches to boycott college basketball games on a specific Saturday.
31. These negotiations culminated in a plan whereby the Community Relations Service, a
branch of the United States Justice Department, intervened to mediate the BCA's dispute
with the NCAA. BCA Delays Boycott Action, NCAA NEws, Jan. 19, 1994, at 1; Steve Rich-
ardson, Black Coaches Association Postpones Boycott of College Basketball Games, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Jan. 15, 1994, at 1A. The first in a series of mediation sessions between the
BCA and NCAA was convened on March 1, 1994. Wieberg, supra note 30, at 1C. In turn,
these discussions led to an agreement that addressed "a number of issues related to expansion
of education, employment and governance-participation opportunities for Blacks and other
ethnic minorities within the NCAA .. " Method for Addressing Issues Provided by NCAA-
BCA Talks, NCAA NEWS, Mar. 30, 1994, at 1. The agreement delineated a set of governing
principles that provided the framework for future discussions between the BCA and NCAA.
In addition, endorsements set forth in the agreement call for enhanced communication be-
tween the NCAA and the BCA so as to facilitate increased opportunities for African-Ameri-
cans to participate in all levels of intercollegiate athletes. Debra E. Blum, Black Coaches and
NCAA Agree to Discuss Disputed Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 30, 1994, at A36 (sum-
marizing the accord reached between the NCAA and BCA).
32. Richard Lapchick credits the BCA for the recent surge of interest on the issue of
racism in college sport. Richard Lapchick, Finally a Small Step in the Right Direction, SPORT-
ING NEws, Jan. 31, 1994, at 8.
The BCA's activities represent a continuation of protest efforts by black coaches and ad-
ministrators. As noted by one commentator, "[flor years, black coaches and others have com-
plained about academic standards set by the NCAA, which they say discriminate against black
athletes. They have also voiced their discontent with what they see as the shrinking availabil-
ity of scholarships for black athletes and limited opportunities in college sports for the ad-
vancement of black coaches." Debra E. Blum, Black Coaches vs. an NCAA Rule, CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 10, 1993, at A36.
[Vol. 6:199
1996] MARGINALIZING THE NCAA REGULATORY SCHEME 205
The alleged unfairness of NCAA rules with respect to African-Amer-
ican student-athletes represents one of the primary concerns on which
the BCA has aroused interest.33 Several NCAA rules allegedly reflect
racial or cultural bias.' These rules include: a) alleged disparate impact
and cultural bias of NCAA initial eligibility standards;35 b) rules that
restrict the money student-athletes are permitted to earn; and c) legisla-
tion that limits the access of coaches to student-athletes and prospective
recruits.36 This essay examines two of these concerns: initial eligibility
standards and financial restrictions.
33. The alleged racial insensitivity of NCAA rules is perceived as one of the manifesta-
tions of a larger problem-the persistence of racism in college sport. The BCA identifies "two
broad category of harmful consequences caused by the persistence of racism in intercollegiate
athletics: (i) denial of unqualified participation in the college sport infrastructure; and (ii) the
adverse impact on the academic, social and psychological well-being of the African-American
student-athlete." Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The Persistence of Racism in
College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615, 653 (1995). See Black Caucus Backs Basketball
Coaches, DETROIT FiREE PRE-ss, Oct. 20, 1993, at 2C (noting black coaches' criticisms of uni-
form rules that more severely impact the interests of African-American student-athletes);
Black Coaches Seek Help on Capitol Hill, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Oct. 20, 1993, at 1D
(discussing how several NCAA policies disparately impact African-Americans).
34. In addition to the legislation discussed below, critics assert that other NCAA legisla-
tion and decisions result in inequitable treatment for African-American student-athletes. This
includes NCAA legislation that reduced the number of athletic scholarships in basketball and
football. As a part of an agenda aimed at reducing costs of intercollegiate athletic programs,
the NCAA at its 1993 convention reduced scholarships as follows: football from 95 in 1992 to
85 in 1994, and basketball from 15 in 1992 to 13 in 1993. NCAA MANUAL arts. 15.5.4, 15.5.5;
Steve Berkowitz, Two Groups, but Similar Agenda,- Black Basketball Coaches Split from Na-
tional Group to Press Issues, WASH. PosT, Oct. 19, 1993, at E2.
Critics assert these reductions limit opportunities for prospective African-American stu-
dent-athletes. George H. Raveling, Black Coaches Want to be Heard, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 29,
1993, at 4; Berkowitz, supra, at Fl. BCA members asserted that scholarship reductions elimi-
nate opportunities for black student-athletes and demonstrate a lack of sensitivity to the Afri-
can-American community. John Weyler, Baker Among Those Boycotting Conference of Black
Coaches, L.A. Tnvms, Oct. 19, 1993, at 7C. Others expressed concern that cuts in scholarships
were made to accommodate gender equity issues at the expense of issues and concerns involv-
ing black athletes. Berkowitz, supra, at Fl.
At its 1996 Convention, the NCAA rejected a proposal that would have increased the
number of men's basketball scholarships from 13 to 14. NCAA Convention, NCAA NEws,
Jan. 11, 1996, at 6C.
35. Raveling, supra note 34, at 5.
36. The NCAA imposes limitations on the amount of time that Division I student-athletes
can spend with off-season sports programs. NCAA MANUAL art. 17.1.5.2. In discussing this
issue in an earlier article, I concluded as follows: "Limiting the degree to which student-ath-
letes can participate in such organized activities has the subsidiary effect of limiting the time
that they spend under a coach's guidance. Black coaches criticize this rule as interfering with
the mentoring function that African-American coaches can provide for black-students." Da-
vis, supra note 33, at 661; see Blum, supra note 32, Nov. 10, 1993, at A48 (noting the access of
coaches to players and prospective players is a concern which seems only to have recently
emerged).
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A. Earned Income Limitations
At their 1996 Convention, NCAA members defeated a proposal that
would have exempted from scholarship athlete's grant-in-aid limits
money that they earned from employment during the academic year
when their sport was not in season.37 A more controversial proposal
that would have "permitted student-athletes to work during the aca-
demic year and exempt up to $1,500 from grant-in-aid limits was with-
Similar criticisms are voiced with respect to NCAA rules limiting coaches' access to high
school students. NCAA rules limit the contact that coaches may have with prospective stu-
dent-athletes from the time the latter enter the ninth grade. Recruiting contact limitations
grew out of abuses relating to contact with high school athletes. Blum, supra, at A49. Possible
legitimate reasons for such limitations have not quieted critics:
The problem with the rules at the high school level echoes that of the NCAA rules:
such restrictions inhibit the mentoring role that coaches can provide for troubled black
youths. The frustration emanating from this rule was dramatically articulated by John
Thompson: "When somebody's shooting somebody down here on First and K Street
and I can't jump in a car and go down there because, without a manual, I can't deter-
mine whether he's a recruitable athlete or not, that's where we're frustrated." In short,
many African-American coaches view such rules as being inconsistent with what they
perceive as their special obligation to help young people in African-American
communities.
Davis, supra note 33, at 661-62. See id. at 661 n.242 (discussing the skepticism held by many in
the athletic community of the seemingly altruistic motivations of black coaches).
37. Ronald D. Mott, Delegates Reject Modification to Initial-Eligibility Standards, NCAA
NEws, Jan. 15, 1996, at 7. Delegates were concerned that approval of this proposal would lead
to athletic departments arranging jobs for students that required no real work. Debra E.
Blum, Upholding Standards: NCAA Rejects Effort to Ease Eligibility Rules; Changes in Gov-
ernance Approved, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 1996, at A31, A33.
The text of Proposal 31, provided, in part, as follows: "Permit Division I student-athletes
to exempt legitimate on-or-off campus employment income in excess of a full grant-in-aid,
provided the employment occurs during the nontraditional or out-of-season segment of the
playing season in the student-athlete's sport .. " Convention will Focus Right Away on Re-
structuring, NCAA NEws, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, 9.
The NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Committee advocated in favor of Proposal 31. "We
feel very strongly about a student's right to work.... Often, a full grant-in-aid does not cover
a number of incidental expenses. Allowing a student-athlete to work in the off-season would
enable that individual to receive valuable work experience while at the same time earning
money for outside expenses." Bridget Niland, A Mixed Bag of Results from the Convention,
NCAA NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 4.
It should be noted that student-athletes do not represent a monolithic group with all mem-
bers sharing identical interests. One commentator spoke to this reality in the context of com-
pensation. "Yet even within the limited context of revenue-producing sports, student-athlete
interests are far from uniform. While the limits on compensation seem to penalize the very
best football and basketball players, for instance, other athletes may actually benefit if restric-
tions on marketable players leave more money for granting scholarships and related support
to those who are not among the very best athletes." Skeel, supra note 21, at 670.
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drawn."3 In a move viewed as favorable for student-athletes, delegates
voted to discontinue calculating Pell Grants into determining what con-
stitutes a full grant-in-aid.39
The foregoing actions by NCAA delegates are the latest in the con-
tinuing controversy surrounding NCAA restrictions on the amounts stu-
dent-athletes are permitted to earn. For example, the BCA and other
groups have argued in favor of controversial proposals that would permit
student-athletes to receive stipends of as much as $1,500 per year.40
These proposals represent an assault on NCAA regulations that limit the
amount of income that student-athletes can earn.4 ' Yet proponents of
these initiatives argue that easing financial restrictions on student-ath-
letes is justified given the effort expended by student-athletes and the
benefits derived therefrom by their institutions.42 Critics also point to
the limited access that student-athletes from economically disadvantaged
backgrounds have to spending money as a basis for easing limits on the
income student-athletes are permitted to earn.43
Opponents of initiatives that would pay student-athletes a stipend
and ease other financial restrictions argue that student-athletes are ade-
quately compensated. They believe that the athletic scholarship, the
NCAA's special assistance fund, and Pell Grants are sufficient to satisfy
38. Id. Proposal 32 provided: "Permit Division I student-athletes to earn up to $1,500 in
legitimate on-or-off campus employment income in excess of a full grant-in-aid, provided the
institution's athletics department staff members and/or representatives of the institution's ath-
letics interests are not involved in arranging the employment." Convention Will Focus Right
Away on Restructuring, NCAA NEWS, Nov. 27, 1995, at 1, 9.
39. Id. Proposal 33 provides "that a Pell Grant shall not be included when determining
the permissible amount of a full grant-in-aid for a student-athlete." Id.
40. Raveling, supra note 34, at 5. The NCAA Student-Athlete Advisory Council is
among the groups that support this and other legislation easing restrictions on the income
student-athletes can earn. Student-Athletes Push Earnings Proposal Again, NCAA NEws,
Sept. 18, 1995, at 5.
41. Davis, supra note 33, at 662.
42. Ronald D. Mott, Student-Athlete Voices Join Pay-for-Play Debate, NCAA NEws, Sept.
19, 1994, at 1, 19. Explained a student-athlete from a high profile program, "athletes are put
through tough workouts and (are) expected to train and keep up their skill level all year ......
Id. at 19. This perspective was echoed by another student-athlete. "I do feel that these play-
ers should receive some type of status other than scholarships, especially the athletes, whom
these universities are really broadcasting and using (their) names on university issues.... ." Id.
The extent to which institutions derive financial benefits from the services provided by
their student-athletes is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 81-91.
43. Black Coaches Association Seeks End to Freshman Eligibility, NCAA NEws, June 1,
1994, at 1. Studies reveal that African-American student-athletes come from households with
lower socioeconomic status. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., REPT. No. 3: ExPERIENcE S OF BLAcK IN-
TERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS AT NCAA DivisioN I INSTrUTIONS 13 (1989).
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financial needs of student-athletes.44 The financial realities of intercolle-
giate athletes are also stated as a rationale for rejecting pay-for-play
ideas. 45 Says one coach commenting on the stipend issue, "I agree that it
would be wonderful if it could be done, but when you're looking at the
number of athletics departments that are running in the red already and
the fact that if you are going to do it for revenue-producing sports-
football and basketball-you also are going to have to do it for a similar
number of female athletes... I just don't think it's feasible." 46
B. Academic Eligibility Standards
At the 1996 NCAA Convention, delegates acted on other rules that
have been criticized as racially insensitive to black student-athletes: ini-
tial eligibility standards. The delegates rejected a proposal to modify
Proposition 16. Under Proposition 16, eligibility is determined pursuant
to an indexed scale, which requires that high school graduates with a 700
or 17, on the SAT or ACT, respectively, must have at least a 2.5 GPA in
a core curriculum that consists of 13 courses.47 A prospective student-
athlete with a 2.0 GPA would be required to score at least 900 or 17 on
the SAT or ACT, respectively.48 The rejected proposal sought to rede-
fine partial qualifiers so as to include those student-athletes who would
be qualifiers under the existing standards known as Proposition 48. In
rejecting Proposal 19, the NCAA membership decided to adhere to
44. Jonathan Feigen, Green with Envy; Athletes Earn Colleges and NCAA Money, but
what's in it for Them?, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, March 31, 1995, at 1 (discussing the position of
NCAA administrators who also contend that a college education and the college experience
are of substantial value to student-athletes).
Others, however, challenge the assertion that scholarships adequately compensate student-
athletes. Notes one commentator, "a scholarship is a pittance compared to the millions of
dollars that an institution can make." Leroy D. Clark, Pay to Play: is It Time to Change the
Playing Field?, EMERGE, Oct. 31, 1994, at 54. Moreover, the value of the scholarship is ques-
tionable inasmuch as many student-athletes obtain little in the way of substantive educational
benefit from their college experience. Id. See Feigen, supra (quoting a basketball coach who
states that the $40,000 estimated value of tuition and other benefits is minuscule in compari-
son to the billions generated).
45. Id. Feigen, supra note 44, at 1 (noting that according to NCAA executive director,
Cedric Dempsey, paying student-athletes a stipend would add to athletic budgets already in
the red).
46. Id.
47. NCAA MANUAL art. 14, § 14.3.1.1.1(b).
48. Id. § 14.3.1.1(a). Under current standards, commonly known as Proposition 48, a
scholarship athlete is eligible to compete during his or her first year only if he or she scores
700 or 17 on the SAT and ACT, respectively. The student must also have at least a 2.0 grade
point average in a core curriculum which consists of 11 courses. Id. §§ 14.3.1.1(a), (b).
49. Mott, supra note 37, at 7. "The measure, Proposal 19, would have lowered the bar for
athletes to be considered as partial qualifiers under the new rules [Proposition 16]. . ... The
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plans to toughen academic standards for freshman athletes."0 In addi-
tion, a proposal that would have eliminated the standardized test score
component of Proposition 16 requirements if an incoming freshman
demonstrated a strong high school record was withdrawn for lack of
support.5 '
The NCAA's decision to reject efforts to redefine partial qualifiers
represents the latest chapter in the debate concerning the fairness of ini-
tial eligibility standards. The soon to be effective Proposition 16 and its
predecessor Proposition 48 have been subjected to harsh criticism. Crit-
ics assert that these rules reflect bias against African-American student-
athletes. 2 Specifically, critics challenge these standards as relying too
failed proposal would have permitted athletes who meet some but not all of the rules to com-
pete as freshman." Id.
50. Debra E. Blum, Upholding Standards, NCAA Rejects Effort to Ease Eligibility Rules;
Changes in Governance Approved, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 19, 1996, at A31. Proposal 19
lost by three votes when it was initially considered and by two votes on reconsideration. Id.
51. Debra E. Blum, Legal Challenges; Restricted-Earnings Rules, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.,
Jan. 19, 1996, at A33. This proposal was supported by the NAACP, the Women's Sports Foun-
dation, and the Mid-Eastern Athletic Conference, a league of historically black Division I
colleges. Id.
52. Professor Linda Greene, the first legal scholar to critically evaluate initial eligibility
rules, examined Proposition 48. Linda S. Greene, The New NCAA Rules of the Game: Aca-
demic Integrity or Racism, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 101 (1984). Based upon her examination, she
concluded that its implementation invoked both procedural and substantive concerns. The
former related to the exclusion of African-American educators and administrators in the rule
promulgation process. The substantive concerns related to the potentially adverse impact of
the rules on African-American student-athletes and historically black colleges. 1d. at 111-12.
Other commentators have evaluated equal protection challenges premised on the dispropor-
tionate impact of the standards on African-Americans. See generally Michael R. Lufrano, The
NCAA's Involvement in Setting Academic Standards: Legality and Desirability, 4 SETON HALL
J. SPORT L. 97 (1994).
In addition to charges of racism, other less publicized, yet in many cases related criticisms,
were leveled against Proposition 48. Some critics lashed out at the universal application of
Proposition 48. They argued that it failed to take into account the unique circumstances not
only of student-athletes but also of institutions. Marvin Cobb, Schools Have Responsibility to
Underprepared Athletes, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 1992, at 8C (noting that Proposition 48 indi-
rectly limited black athletes' access to historically black institutions as well as predominantly
white institutions). David Davidson, Administrators Say Prop 48 a Lose-Lose Situation, AT-
LANTA J. CONST. July 28, 1991, at F1 (arguing Proposition 48 failed to provide for institutional
diversity). An administrator at a historically black institution expressed the following criti-
cism: "An athlete below a 2.5 might have trouble at Notre Dame or Penn State or Southern
California, but he would be right in line and have a good opportunity for success at Valley,
Grambling, Jackson State and a lot of predominantly black institutions. ... " Id.
Other critics asserted that Proposition 48 had less to do with restoring academic integrity
and more to do with protecting the sphere of influence and power of the NCAA. Some per-
ceived it as a measure intended to serve as a shield against governmental legislation that
would regulate sports. William C. Rhoden, Sports of the Times: N.C.A.A.'s Smoke and Mir-
rors, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 11, 1992, § 1, at 27.
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heavily on what they believe are culturally and racially biased standard-
ized tests.53 Data collected by the NCAA and independent researchers
to the effect that "class room performance is by far the best predictor of
academic achievement in college" lend credence to these allegations.54
According to critics, heightened standards unfairly reduce college access
to many black student-athletes unable to comply with the rules.55
On the other hand, advocates for heightened standards argue that
stricter initial eligibility standards reflect neither patent nor latent ra-
cism. Rather, they argue that the new standards promote the education
value. 6 Proponents also argue that heightened standards represent a
means of ensuring that student-athletes have a reasonable chance to ob-
tain a meaningful degree. 7 The nature of the debate is reflected in
Finally, others viewed the new standards as a move by the NCAA to protect the competi-
tive position of predominantly white Division I institutions. Cobb, supra note 52.
53. Cobb, supra note 52. For example, the National Center for Fair and Open Testing
(FairTest), a non-profit group that monitors standardized tests, asserts that the NCAA's initial
eligibility rules reflect racial and gender bias. Blum, supra note 51, at A33. Specifically,
FairTest alleges that reliance on standardized tests has a disparate impact on black and fe-
males. Id. The findings of FairTest can be found in FAIR TEST, NATIONAL REPORT OF THE
McINTOSH COMMISSION FOR FAIR PLAY IN STUDENT-ATHLETE ADMISSIONS (1994).
54. Bob Oates, The Heartless Bunch; College Presidents Disregard NCAA Studies: SAT
Test Are Unfair to Athletes, L.A. Tir~ms, Jan. 8, 1995, at C23.
55. Davis, supra note 33, at 666. In 1993, the President of the BCA, Marian Washington,
asserted that the NCAA would soon "be legislating people out of going to college." Steve
Berkowitz, Coaches' Boycott Possible: African-American Officials Air Grievances, WASH.
POST, Oct. 11, 1993, at C5.
Two-thirds of the students who failed to meet Proposition 48 requirements were minori-
ties. Steve Weiberg, Minority Leaders Set to Respond to Academic Rules, USA TODAY, Jan. 6,
1995, at 10C.
56. For many, Propositions 48 and 16 marked the beginning of efforts to restore academic
integrity at colleges and universities, which had been undermined by scandals arising from
intercollegiate sports. Rhoden, supra note 52, § 1.
57. Davidson, supra note 52, at F1 (quoting a college administrator).
Blacks did not express a homogenous view with regard to Proposition 48. The National
Alliance of Black School Educators, National Associations for Equality of Opportunity in
Higher Education, and notable African-Americans such as Jesse Jackson and Benjamin
Hooks criticized the lack of black input in formulating the standards as well as the discrimina-
tory implications of the rules. Audwin Anderson & Donald South, Racial Differences in Col-
legiate Recruiting, Retention, and Graduation Rates, in RACISM IN COLLEGE ATHLETICS: THE
AFRICAN-AMERICAN ATHLETE's EXPERIENCE 89-90 (Dana Brooks & Ronald Althouse eds.,
1993).
An equally sincere group of African-Americans viewed the standards as nondiscriminatory
and a step towards emphasizing the educational component of college athletics and stemming
the exploitation of African-American student-athletes. Id. Lloyd V. Hackley, Chancellor of
the University of Arkansas at Pine Bluff, Arthur Ashe, and Harry Edwards were among those
favoring the new standards as tools for motivating black student-athletes to focus more on
education. Id.
[Vol. 6:199
1996] MARGINALIZING THE NCAA REGULATORY SCHEME 211
comments made during discussions of proposals to modify the definition
of partial qualifiers under Proposition 16:
Expressing concern about the impact of Proposal No. 19 on
ethnic minorities, [Steven B.] Sample, [president of the University
of Southern California], said increasing academic requirements is
in the best interest of student-athletes. He added that the passage
a decade ago of Proposition 48 - perhaps the most publicized
legislation in the history of the Association - has benefited
minorities....
Nothing has done more to raise standards in our inner-city
schools than Prop 48. Student-athletes are the role models in our
inner city schools ... and the really good news is that if we stand
firm, (performance) standards are going to go up dramatically.
The adoption of Proposition 19 will do good things for
minorities.5"
In short, those who favor Proposition 16 argue that African-Ameri-
can student-athletes will meet the new academic challenges presented by
Proposition 16:59 They point to findings that black student-athletes are
entering Division I institutions at rates higher now than before Proposi-
tion 48 went into effect to support their position. 60 Critics of stricter
standards assert that such figures belie the fact that standards discrimi-
nate against black student-athletes and those from lower socio-economic
backgrounds. 61 "Yes, you will get student-athletes who meet the stan-
dards, but are you simply replacing students from low socio-economic
backgrounds with people from higher socio-economic backgrounds?"'6
They also point out that the number of whites to blacks on athletic schol-
58. Ronald D. Mott, Delegates Reject Modifications to Initial-Eligibility Standards, NCAA
NEws, Jan. 15, 1996, at 7.
59. See, e.g., William Friday & Leroy Walker, Minorities will Gain, not Lose, under Plan,
USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 1995, at 2C; E.M. Swift, Propping up Student-Athletes; With Prop 48's
Success, College Educators are Pushing High Schoolers to Aim Even Higher, SPORTS ILLus-
TRATED, Dec. 4, 1994, at 88.
60. Debra E. Blum, Proportion of Black Athletes Rises at NCAA's Division I Institutions,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 10, 1995, at A36.
61. Id. Others caution against drawing conclusions from the data due to a lack of availa-
bility of comparable data for all entering freshman which might provide insight on trends that
could have had an impact on the entry of black student-athletes. Id.
62. Id. (quoting William B. DeLauder, president of Delaware State University). Others
assert that no evidence exists to support assertions that lower socio-economic minority stu-
dents are being replaced by those who are better-off. Friday & Walker, supra note 59, at 2C.
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arships has increased since tougher initial eligibility requirements took
effect.63
More fundamentally, critics assert that tougher standards focus
blame on student-athletes for the failure of institutions to curb the edu-
cational exploitation of their athletes.64 Stiffer requirements are seen as
a mechanism to create a positive perception and ease the public's fears
regarding the imbalance between athletics and education.65 In other
words, heightening eligibility requirements are viewed as an easy means
of shifting educational responsibility from universities to student-
athletes.66
IV. THE MARGINALIZATION OF NCAA RULEs
In summary, critics assert that, with regard to African-Americans,
certain NCAA rules reflect racial bias, cultural insensitivity, or both.
Such criticisms are derived in large measure from beliefs that certain
rules are divorced from the realities of the African-American student-
athletes' experiences. The essay next discusses the consequences of such
perceptions.
A. Contributing Factors
1. Dissonance Between NCAA Rules and Justifications
Rules provide the guidance that allows us to organize our morality,
social behavior, and legal relations.67 They are designed to promote an
end and therefore to obtain particular principles.68 "The principle is the
end and the rule is the means. " 69 But a rule functions as more than the
articulation of specific objectives, it also imposes sanctions for violations
of its terms.70
63. Steve Weiberg, Prop 48 Study Raises Questions of Racial Equity, USA TODAY, July 7,
1995, at 10C. According to results released in 1995, the "ratio of whites to blacks on athletic
scholarships has gone from 2.5-to-1 to 3-to-i." Id.
64. Oates, supra note 54, at C3.
65. Charles Farrell, Many Blacks Would Not Get Chance to Attend College, Ci. Trm.,
Jan. 8, 1995, at 5C.
66. Id.
67. Larry Alexander & Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature of Rules, 142 PENN. L. Rv.
1191 (1991) (adding that "effective government depends on rules and obedience to rules");
Robert Henle, Principles of Legality: Qualities of Lon Fuller, St Thomas Aquinas, 39 AM. J.
JURIS. 47 (1994) (noting Fuller's proposition that rules are necessary to have a viable society).
68. Allison, supra note 23, at 12.
69. Allison, supra note 23, at 13.
70. Id. at 11 ("rules designate the consequence of violative acts"); Alexander & Sherwin,
supra note 67, at 1194, 1199.
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The rules and regulations that comprise the NCAA regulatory struc-
ture adhere to established precepts concerning the purpose and function
of rules. As discussed above, NCAA rules are promulgated to promote
the principles of amateurism, educational primacy and competitiveness.
Moreover, the NCAA's regulatory scheme incorporates procedures for
investigating and meting out sanctions for conduct that violates the rules
that theoretically attempt to achieve these objectives. Yet the threat of
significant sanctions, such as the loss of athletic eligibility, has not de-
terred student-athlete conduct that defies the NCAA regulatory system
and consequently marginalizes it.
One factor that contributes to the marginalization of NCAA rules is
the perceived dissonance between NCAA rules and the principles that
they are intended to promote. In discussing rules in the context of the
NCAA's rule-making process, Professor John Allison states that accu-
racy in rule-making occurs when a rule is specified that seems best to
implement the backing principle. 71 He concludes that rules that inade-
quately promote the principles of educational primacy are inaccurate
and tend to negatively impact student-athletes. 72 As noted above, simi-
lar arguments have been made with respect to rules intended to promote
the amateurism value.
The exclusion of student-athletes from the decision-making process
may also undermine the legitimacy of NCAA rules and regulations. Re-
cently, the NCAA has attempted to enhance the role of student-athletes
in its governance process, principally through a Student-Athlete Advi-
sory Committee.73 For a variety of reasons, the advisory commitee and
other mechanisms intended to amplify the student-athlete's voice in
NCAA decision-making fail to serve as appropriate vehicles for ob-
taining input from student-athletes.74 Unfortunately, the absence of ef-
fective student-athlete representation in the NCAA governance process
makes it easier to ignore their interests, which results in inequitable
71. Allison, supra note 23, at 13.
72. Id.
73. NCAA MANuAL art. 21.3.28. The purpose of the committee is to "receive informa-
tion on and explanations of NCAA activities and legislation and, in consultation with former
NCAA officers ... review and react to topics referred to it by other [NCAA] committees and
by the Council." Id at art. 21.3.28.3. Other mechanisms intended to increase student-athlete
input include requiring that each NCAA member institution create student-athlete advisory
committees and adding student-athletes to NCAA committees. Skeel, supra note 21, at 679.
74. Allison, supra note 23, at 24-25. Professor Allison discusses the factors that limit
meaningful student-athlete input into the NCAA rule-making process. IL See also Skeel,
supra note 21, at 679 (discussing the same).
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treatment.75 According to one commentator, "inclusion is justified as a
means of ensuring that decision-makers will pay closer attention to the
constituency in question." 76 Thus, inequities converge with ineffective
opportunities for input into NCAA decision-making to increase the like-
lihood that student-athletes will question the legitimacy of the NCAA
regulatory structure.77
a. Institutional Commercialism
In addition, student-athlete attitudes concerning those charged with
enforcement responsibilities significantly contribute to the devaluation
of NCAA rules and the principles on which they are premised.71 The
NCAA's executive director, Cedric Dempsey, recently warned that
"mistrust among college athletic programs and duplicitous behavior by
college administrators have placed the NCAA in peril. '79 The duplici-
tous behavior described by Dempsey includes the gap between what ad-
ministrators say and what they do.
The entry of colleges into the lucrative athletic endorsement field is
illustrative of the type of institutional commercial behavior that gener-
ates cynicism on the part of student-athletes and thereby undermines the
amateurism and educational values professed to underlie NCAA rules
and regulations.80 During 1994, colleges generated $2.5 billion in retail
sales of merchandise bearing their names, logos, and mascots.8 ' Many of
college athletics most successful programs' have entered into multi-mil-
lion dollar deals with major apparel manufacturers such as Nike and
75. Smith, supra note 15, at 264-66.
76. Skeel, supra note 21, at 677.
77. See Allison, supra note 23, at 14 (suggesting that effective involvement in the decision-
making process confers legitimacy on decisions).
78. See Jane K. Winn, Relationship Practices and the Marginalization of Law: Informal
Financial Practice of Small Business in Taiwan, 28 LAW & SocIETY 193, 201 (1994) (identifying
formalistic legislation divorced from social realities and the misconduct of those charged with
enforcing laws as contributing to the marginalization of law).
79. Doug Bedell, NCAA's Leader Warns of Dangers for Athletics, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Jan. 8, 1996, at 3B.
80. Another all too familiar illustration is the message sent by administrators who profess
the values of academic primacy and amateurism while luring coaches with huge salaries and
dismissing them solely on the basis of their win-loss record. Id.
81. Mark Asher, NCAA Schools Search for Shoe Deals that Fit; College Gear Worth Mil-
lions to Nike, Schools, WASH. PosT, Nov. 19, 1995, at Al.
82. Apparel companies such as Nike and Reebok are most interested in dealing with
schools with successful and visible athletic programs. For example seven of the 10 schools
with whom Nike and Reebok have all-sports contracts were ranked in 1995 among the top 25
football teams. Id.
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Reebok.s3 For example, over the next five years the Nike swoosh logo
will appear on the team jerseys, shoes, wristbands, and gloves of football
players at Florida State. In addition, it will appear on clothing and hats
worn by Florida State football coach Bobby Bowden and his staff.' In
exchange, Nike will pay Florida State six million dollars, and provide
equipment and apparel for Florida State's seventeen varsity teams.
Coach Bowden will receive a yearly payment of $225,000 in addition to
his salary. 5
Nike sells Florida State football jerseys with the number of a star
running back. When the athlete was asked whether he should receive
money for the sale of these jerseys, he replied:
That always crosses my mind. Just imagine if I wore another
number, they'd probably be buying that number.... The univer-
sity's just making money off of us. We can't do anything about
that. All we do is go out and play well, get a free education, and
hopefully good things happen to us.8 6
The foregoing statement is consistent with the belief that a possible
consequence of this new form of corporate involvement is that compa-
nies such as Nike may play too significant a role in the affairs of college
athletic programs.s7 Moreover, collegiate administrators and officials
are concerned that this involvement "fosters an environment in which
athletes might be more tempted than ever to accept money or gifts from
player agents or boosters in violation of [NCAA] rules, or leave school
well before their scheduled graduation dates." 8
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. Nike has contracted with several other major football powerhouses. "Michigan's
deal will give the school $8 million in cash and equipment over six years; Colorado's $5.6
million over six years; Penn State's $2.6 million over three years.... Reebok has a six-year,
$6.48 million arrangement with UCLA ... ." Id.
86. Id. Another student-athlete explains:
A certain level of hypocrisy surrounds any major athletics program. College ath-
letes are asked to sacrifice in order to generate revenue to support total athletics pro-
grams. Moreover, both directly and indirectly, entire universities and college-town
communities derive significant revenue from those attending athletics events. At the
same time, athletes are denied academic scholarships that they may earn through scho-
lastic excellence. They also are ineligible for certain need-based financial aid for which
they may qualify.
Rob Zatechka, Outright Pay is not the Only Alternative, NCAA NEws, Aug. 3, 1994, at 4-5.
87. Id.
88. Id. Washington Bullets basketball star Chris Webber has stated that the NCAA rules
and the money that Michigan made from selling his jersey and likeness influenced his decision
to leave after his sophomore year. Id.
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School officials justify these arrangements on grounds that the reve-
nues generated are necessary to fund the non-revenue producing sports.
Others criticize the duplicitous nature of these attitudes. Noted one ad-
ministrator, "I would object to any suggestion we are selling out the stu-
dent .... The fact of life, at least as far as college athletics is concerned,
is that two sports are revenue producing sports and 18 sports are not."8' 9
Institutions making these statements have been criticized as trying to
have it both ways.
This new form of commercialism has led many commentators to cyni-
cally describe student-athletes as walking billboard/advertisements. 90
Moreover, the effect of such arrangements will no doubt exacerbate the
problems that have ensued from the increased commercialization of col-
lege athletics.91 For example, because of the potentially significant reve-
nues that can be derived from the sponsorship arrangements, the
pressure to win will only be enhanced. 2 Added to this is the fundamen-
tal change in the university's relationship with its student-athletes. 93
Notes one commentator: "The advertising potential of each student is
now an asset the university will seek to claim."'94 "It's becoming harder
and harder to talk about the athletes as students, because it looks like
they're really just engaged in a money-making enterprise for the
university. '95
The duplicitous nature of these institutional activities was described
by Walter Byers as follows:
Thus, while accepting the highest possible commercialization
of their "extracurricular" sports activities, the colleges even to
this day steadfastly:
89. Dan Cray, Colleges Score Windfall Selling Ads on Athletes; Sports: Nike and Reebok
Deals Buoy Cash-Strapped Programs, Campus Official Say. Others See Exploitation, L.A.
TIMEs, May 9, 1994, at Al.
90. Id. Sonny Vaccaro, an advocate for paying student-athletes, argues that "universities
are renting space on the student athlete's body, and he's not getting anything for it." Id.
Charlie Vincent, Swoosh U., Home of the Fighting Interest; Colleges Will Sell Their Names, but
Beware the Student Who Tries to Just do It by Himself, SPoRTING Naws, Oct. 9, 1995 (describ-
ing student-athletes as unpaid models for Nike products, plain and simple").
91. Commercialism increases competition and the pressure to win. These pressures often
result in ethical and academic abuses. See, e.g., Timothy Davis, Absence of Good Faith: De-
fining a University's Educational Obligation to Student-Athletes, 28 Hou. L. REv. 751-58
(1991) (describing abuse caused by commercialization in college sports).
92. John Weistart, The 90's University: Reading, Writing and Shoe Contracts, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 28, 1993, § 8, at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Cray, supra note 89.
[Vol. 6:199
1996] MARGINALIZING THE NCAA REGULATORY SCHEME 217
1. deny for tax purposes that they are engaged in a dollar-gener-
ating business enterprise;
2. endorse private initiative on the part of their coaches and
merchandisers, but not their athletes;
3. agree that coaches and staff members should receive bonuses
for winning, making sure NCAA rules deny such rewards to
athletes;
4. enlarge athletics department support staffs, but vote that
grants-in-aid for athletes be reduced; and
5. emphasize that job security for coaches is important and rou-
tinely pay off contracts when they are fired, but insist that
threatened ineligibility for the athlete shall be the main NCAA
enforcement tool.
96
b. Institutional Misconduct
Given the forms of commercial behavior described above, it is not
surprising to find cynicism among student-athletes that contributes to
their marginalization of NCAA rules.97 In addition, institutional in-
volvement in illegal conduct that violates rules premised on amateurism
and educational values further contributes to the willingness to disregard
NCAA rules and regulations. During the past few years, colleges and
universities have been sanctioned for conduct violating the educational
value, which includes: coaches giving junior college recruits terms papers
and changing their test score;98 knowingly allowing athletes to compete
who failed to meet NCAA eligibility requirements;99 and requiring stu-
dent-athletes to participate in athletically related activities in excess of
NCAA weekly time limits.10
Similarly, institutional representatives have participated in conduct
inconsistent with the amateurism principle, including: paying wages and
96. BYERS, supra note 21, at 360-361.
97. Id.
98. Cheating Coaches Spared Jail Terms; 3 Years' Probation for Ex-Baylor Aides, Cm.
TRiB., July 8, 1995, at N1. The Baylor University men's basketball coach and three of his
assistant coaches were indicted on federal mail fraud and wire fraud charges for their part in a
scheme to provide fraudulent academic credit for junior-college basketball players. Danny
Robbins, Johnson's Blueprint Spelled Baylor's Ruin: Scandal Could Rival SMU Violations,
HouSTON CHRONICLE, Jan. 20, 1994. The three assistant coaches were found guilty. CHI.
TRB., supra.
99. Infractions Case: University of Washington, NCAA NEvs, Mar. 9, 1994, at 16 (describ-
ing one of the violations that resulted in probation for Washington State University's athletics
program).
100. Id.
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granting tuition waivers to athletes for work they failed to perform; 01
providing extra benefits in the form of payments totalling close to
$100,000 to student-athletes;'0 2 and a coach offering cash to a student-
athlete in return for signing a Letter of Intent. 0 3
The University of Miami's Pell Grant scandal provides perhaps the
most celebrated of the recent illustrations of institutional involvement in
conduct violative of NCAA rules. Among the violations that resulted in
the NCAA sanctioning Miami's program are: the award by the school of
more than $412,000 in excessive financial aid; an athletic department
representative assisted sixty to seventy-seven student-athletes in fraudu-
lently obtaining Pell Grant funds; and failure by the athletic department
to adhere to the institution's drug testing program.10 4
2. Dissonance Between NCAA Rules and Social Realities
As noted above, many NCAA rules are perceived as unfairly anti-
thetical to the interests of African-American student-athletes. Several
factors contribute to the development of these beliefs. Primary among
them is the notion that NCAA rules are culturally insensitive in their
failure to consider African-American student-athletes' experiences. In
short, a dissonance allegedly exits between NCAA rules and the social
and economic realities experienced by African-American student-ath-
letes. As discussed below, rules believed to be divorced from reality re-
sult in their devaluation.
The consequences of these perceptions are multiple. Most funda-
mentally, the actors whose conduct rules are intended to govern are less
likely to adhere to them. This is true in spite of sanctions that will be
imposed for rules violations. As was recently noted, sanctions alone do
not "engender belief in rules; they simply coerce action that simulates
the action citizens would take if they believed in the rules." 0 5 Thus the
threat of sanctions is an ineffective coercive instrument regarding rules
perceived as unfair or irrelevant. In the context of college sport, experi-
101. Id
102. From 1986 through 1989, the head wrestling coach for Virginia State University pro-
vided at least $99,429 of improper tuition assistance for approximately 30 student-athletes.
Virginia State Placed on Probation for Two Years, NCAA NEws, Feb. 22, 1995, at 14.
103. The University of Mississippi's athletic program was placed on four years probation
because of this and other conduct. Mississippi Receives Four Years of Probation, NCAA
Nn-ws, Nov. 21, 1994, at 18.
104. Infractions Case: University of Miami (Florida), NCAA REGISTER, Dec. 25, 1995, at
4.
105. Alexander & Sherwin, supra note 67, at 1201.
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ence shows us that the threat of ineligibility has not been particularly
effective in curbing student-athlete violations of amateurism rules.
A probable consequence, then, is the marginalization of the NCAA's
formal legislative scheme." 6 In particular, student-athletes tend to dis-
regard rules based on amateurism and educational principles since such
rules are believed to be divorced from social and economic realities.' 7
Persistent and continuing violations by student-athletes of NCAA rules
and regulations said to promote the amateurism value illustrate the ex-
tent to which this marginalization has occurred.10s
Disregard of regulations theoretically premised on the amateurism
principle is well illustrated by what has been described as the "problem
of the 90's and beyond: sports agents involvement with student-ath-
letes."'1 9 Student-athletes violate NCAA rules by signing with agents or
accepting money or gifts from agents."' The University of Miami was
sanctioned by the NCAA for, inter alia, the involvement of sports agents
with several players on Miami's football team."' At least seven Florida
State University football players went to a sporting goods store and se-
lected merchandise worth $6,000.112 The merchandise was paid for by an
agent. Florida State players also, before and after the incident, allegedly
received cash payments in amounts ranging from $60 to more than $200
from agents. In addition, an agent arranged for a $23,000 loan to be
made to the mother of a player.
106. See Winn, supra note 78, at 195 (discussing how the relational structure of traditional
Chinese society marginalizes formal legal institutions).
107. See id. at 201 (identifying formalistic legislation divorced from social realities and the
misconduct of those charged with enforcing laws as contributing to the marginalization of
law).
108. With respect to the educational value, cases involving fraudulent academic creden-
tials and the controversy surrounding student-athletes who transfer from two-year junior col-
leges is illustrative. At the 1996 convention, NCAA members enacted legislation aimed at
curbing academic abuse involving junior college transfers. The thrust of the legislation is two
fold: 1) football and men's basketball players who transfer from two-year colleges to four-
year colleges and who do not satisfy initial eligibility requirements must either have completed
35% of their four-year degree requirements or sit out a season of competition after transfer-
ring; and 2) limitations are placed on the "number of two-year college summer-school trans-
ferable hours for student-athletes who are partial or non-qualifiers." Ronald D. Mott,
Delegates Reject Modifications to Initial-Eligibility Standards, NCAA NEws, Jan. 15, 1996, at 7.
109. Ronald D. Mott & Stephen R. Hagwell, Schools Struggle to Combat Agent Issues,
NCAA NEws, Oct. 16, 1995, at 1.
110. Id. See also NCAA MANUAL arts. 12.1.1 & 12.1.2.
111. Infractions Case: University of Miami (Florida), supra note 104, at 4.
112. Alan Schmadtke, No Major Violations at FSU, NCAA Finds, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Jan. 24, 1996, at Al; Alan Schmadtke, NCAA to "Double-Check" FSU, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Feb. 25, 1995, at B1; Sonja Steptoe & E.M. Swift, Anatomy of a Scandal, SPoRTs ILLUSTR.,
May 16, 1994, at 18.
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The Miami and Florida State experiences provide some indication of
the enormity of the problem. Many of the estimated seventy percent of
student-athletes who have contact with agents are said to receive illegal
benefits. 13 Moreover, an estimated one hundred percent of top football
and basketball players receive benefits from agents.114
Finally, the attitude of student-athletes on a range of other issues re-
flects their views on amateurism. For example, the degree to which stu-
dent-athletes perceive of themselves as employees entitled to employee
rights is an indicator of their commitment to principles of amateurism." 5
Similarly, their attitudes toward the extent to which they are entitled to
share in television revenues provides an indication of their commitment
to these principles." 6
3. Marginalization By Black Student-Athletes
a. Participation in Underground Economy
The limited empirical research suggests a racial variable concerning
the marginalization of NCAA rules and regulations. In a 1991 study,
sociologist Allen Sack examined the degree to which student-athletes vi-
olate NCAA amateurism rules." 7 The study revealed that overall, fifty-
three percent of the athletes surveyed saw nothing wrong with accepting
benefits in violation of NCAA amateurism rules.118 The improper bene-
fits consisted primarily of clothing, meals, money for travel, the use of
cars, and small amounts of spending money.' 9 Most of the former stu-
dent-athletes reported that payments were typically used to meet living
113. Stephen R. Haywell & Ronald D. Mott, Agents Confirm Problems Run Deep,
NCAA NEws, Sept. 25, 1995, at 1, 13.
114. Id. Agents do not limit their gifts to blue-chip prospects. "In fact, more and more
agents-specifically those looking to gain a niche in the business-are recruiting student-ath-
letes with little professional potential on the chance that the athlete may show unexpected
development." Id. at 13.
115. Allen L. Sack, Recruiting: Are Improper Benefits Really Improper?, in THE RULES OF
THE GAME: ETHICS IN COLLEGE SPORT 76-77 (Richard E. Lapchick & John B. Slaughter eds.,
1989).
116. Id.
117. Allen L. Sack, The Underground Economy of College Football, SOCIOLOGY OF
SPORT J. 1 (1991).
118. Id. at 10-11. The athletes in the survey consisted of former college football players
who, at the time of the survey, were current or retired members of National Football League
teams. Id. at 4.
119. Id. at 7.
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expenses.120 A more limited number of athletes reported receiving sub-
stantial benefits such as stipends of several hundred dollars.' 2 '
According to the study, African-American athletes exhibited more of
a willingness than white athletes to participate in what has been charac-
terized as the "underground economy of college football."' 122 As the
study's author noted, "[w]hereas 72% of the black athletes saw nothing
wrong with accepting benefits, this was true of only 47% of the whites.
And the younger the athlete, the less likely they were to see nothing
wrong." 3 Indeed, over fifty percent of the athletes saw nothing wrong
with violating the amateurism principle. 2 4 Professor Sack concludes
that the perception of these athletes is that there was nothing wrong with
participating in the underground economy; this "has more to do with the
perceived injustice of NCAA rules than with immorality on the part of
athletes."' 2 Professor Sack's conclusions are consistent with research
that detected a disproportionately high level of involvement by African-
American student-athletes in major scandals in college sports. 26 Spivey
found that:
[o]f the 29 substantial scandals in collegiate sports during the
1950s and 1960s, 19 occurred on teams with one or more black
athletes. Of these 19 teams, 74 percent of the black athletes, as
compared to 11 percent of the white athletes, were allegedly in-
volved in the rules violations. For example, three of the four ath-
letes charged in the Long Island University basketball fixes were
blacks. Of the eight athletes involved in the Illinois scandal,
seven were black. 27
The author of this study concluded that three factors contributed to the
disproportionately high levels of black involvement in various scandals:
the socio-economic realities that cause the black athlete to seek addi-
tional financial assistance; the recruitment of highly sought after black
athletes; and racism.' 28
120. Id. at 8.
121. Id.
122. The underground economy of college sports extends beyond illegal benefits to stu-
dent-athletes. It also encompasses indirect benefits, such as sneaker endorsement contracts,
which are bestowed on coaches of successful big-time athletic programs. HART-NIBBRIG &
COTrXNGHAM, supra note 25. at 63-64. See Smith, supra note 15, at 225-26.
123. Sack, supra note 117, at 11.
124. Id. at 13.
125. Id.
126. See Donald Spivey, The Black Athlete in Big-Time Intercollegiate Sports, 1941-1968,
44 PHYLON 116, 123 (1983).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that African-American student-athletes
continue to participate in an underground economy. In responding to
the controversy concerning agents, a former student-athlete who now
plays professional football expressed what perhaps is illustrative of the
views of other current and former African-American student-athletes:
The guys accepting pay or the guys who want to take pay, that
mainly falls on you guys-the NCAA.... I think that's your fault
because of the strict restrictions on how long guys can work and
how much (financial aid) guys get.
Many families are too poor to give that child money. My
mom couldn't give me any money. Sometimes your team has
functions where you have to dress up. Some guys don't have
suits. I didn't have a suit. I had to wear jeans all of the
time.... 29
These comments also reflect that from the student-athlete perspective,
rules perceived as unfair and irrelevant to their life circumstances effec-
tively fail to deter illegal involvement within the underground economy
of college sport.
The factors discussed above-dissonance between NCAA rules and
their justifications, institutional conduct, and rules divorced from real-
ity-contribute to the African-American student-athletes' willingness to
marginalize NCAA rules and regulations. In addition to these, other
factors appear to result in the marginalization of rules by African-Amer-
ican student-athletes. A few of these factors are discussed below.
b. Social Realities for African-American Student-Athletes
As noted above, NCAA rules have been criticized for failing to com-
port with the social and economic circumstances of many of the student-
athletes whose conduct they are intended to govern. This appears to be
particularly true in the case of African-American student-athletes. Stud-
ies of the college experiences of African-American student-athletes sug-
gest that they have special needs and are harmed by the failure of
NCAA rules and regulations to consider such needs. Concluded one
sociologist:
129. These comments were made by Greg Hill, a running back for the Kansas City Chiefs.
Ronald D. Mott & Stephen R. Hagwell, Student-Athletes: NCAA Rules no Deterrent for
Agents, NCAA NEws, Oct. 2, 1995, at 1.
Adds another student-athlete: "I think agents usually take advantage of most athletes who
aren't from well-to-do families.... In college they don't have much money, and they're just
making it from day to day." Id. at 8. Some agents disagree. They contend that student-
athletes are very knowledgeable and the line between need and greed can be passed very
quickly. Id.
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Black student-athletes' reliance on off-campus support may inter-
act with their socio-economic background to place them at
greater risk. Because black student-athletes come from poorer
families and because their support systems are more likely to be
located away from campus, it is more difficult for them to access
their support systems personally. This problem is exacerbated by
the NCAA's financial restraints which forbid student-athletes to
work during the school year and yet do not provide them with any
money beyond tuition, room and board.13
0
Richard Lapchick described the social environment that spawns
many of today's black student-athletes as follows:
Our campuses are now attracting a generation of students who
come from a world where for so many hope has been eclipsed by
despair. Many of them are black.
We are now getting student-athletes who have seen friends
killed, who have children of their own, who have family members
with drug or alcohol problems, who are children of abusive par-
ents, or who have themselves been victims of overt acts of
racism.131
As a result of the convergence of these social realities and the factors
delineated above, African-American student-athletes delimit the princi-
ples on which NCAA rules and regulations are based. In so doing, they
jeopardize their eligibility to participate in intercollegiate competition-
a sanction imposed for violating NCAA amateurism rules.' 32 Moreover,
deviations from amateurism rules creates a perception of morally culpa-
ble behavior.' 33 Unfortunately, viewing the African-American student-
athlete's violations of NCAA rules as deviant behavior may provide a
convenient basis for attaching certain stereotypes assigned to African-
Americans, particularly young males, in society at large.' 34 Relatedly,
"[lt has to be a dangerous thing for character-building to have these
130. Robert Sellers et al., Life Experience of Black Student-Athletes in Revenue-Producing
Sports: A Descriptive Empirical Analysis, 1991 AcA. ATn=c J. 20, 33.
131. Richard Lapchick, Race Still Most Pressing Ethical Issue in College Sports, DALLAS
MORNING NEws, Jan. 8, 1996, at 3B.
132. Violations of NCAA amateurism rules result in a student-athlete's loss of amateur
status, which in turn renders him or her ineligible for intercollegiate competition. NCAA
MANUAL art. 12.1.1.
133. Sack, supra note 117, at 1.
134. "The image of young black males conveyed by the mainstream media is one associ-
ated with drugs, crime, and violence .... 'Criminal' has become the noun often used to de-
scribe young black men." Adeno Addis, "Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:" The Mass Media,
Law, and African Americans, 41 BuiF. L. Rnv. 523, 555-56 (1993).
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young athletes seduced or drafted into covert arrangements, which have
the aura of criminality."'1 35
But the consequences of rules violations extend beyond the nurturing
of stereotypical images or criminalizing behavior. Focusing on the stu-
dent-athlete's conduct regarding rules violations heightens the likelihood
that systematic factors will be not be fully considered. 36 In other words,
blaming student-athletes for the existence and perpetuation of the un-
derground economy ignores contradictions in the NCAA governing
structure that nourish its existence. 137 It also de-emphasizes the possibil-
ity that the system of rules may be in need of study and reform.138
c. The Perception of Exploitation
Another factor that may play a particularly important role in the
black student-athletes' willingness to participate in the underground
economies of college sport is the perception of exploitation. I return to
the issue of merchandising. Recall the comment made by the college
administrator that merchandising of football and basketball are critical
since those two sports support the non-revenue sports.139
This comment raises another issue that is often ignored: the role that
African-American student-athletes play in funding non-revenue produc-
135. Clark, supra note 44, at 54.
136. Sociologist Allen Sack refers to this as a person-blame approach to social problems.
"[D]eviance is the result of personal defects, character flaws, or maladjustment." Sack, supra
note 117, at 3. He adds that the approach is imbued with a certain attractiveness to particular
groups. "Person-blame approaches to social problems.. . are more likely to be embraced by
those who benefit from existing social arrangements and see deviant behavior as a threat to
their interests." Id.
137. Sack, supra note 117. From a system-blame approach, athletes who accept money in
excess of that allowed by NCAA rules are no more morally culpable than coaches who make
millions of dollars by endorsing basketball sneakers. The only difference is that the former
lack power and can therefore be labeled as deviant by those who make the rules. Id. at 3. See
EITZEN & SAGE, supra note 20, at 138 (arguing the NCAA deflects attention from systemic
problems by focusing on student-athletes); Clark, supra note 44, at 54 (arguing the system that
denies to student-athletes payment for their services is corrupt not the athlete).
138. Sack, supra note 112, at 13 (suggesting the need to study NCAA amateurism rules in
order to assess their moral legitimacy). See Allison, supra note 23, at 14 (arguing that any
decisional system that has been in existence for some time should be periodically reevaluated
to determine the fit between outcomes and the principles they are intended to promote).
Professor Sack opines that the significance of the theoretical and public policy questions
concerning underground payments provides a reason why systematic studies of the under-
ground economy have not been conducted. "Instead of doing systematic studies, people often
take lists of alleged cases of athletes' misconduct from newspaper accounts, pick the behaviors
they dislike most and then try to come up with some explanation for those behaviors." Id. at
4.
139. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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ing sports. The infrequent discussion on this issue is due, in part, to disa-
greement concerning the extent to which the revenue producing sports-
football and men's basketball-actually contribute to funding of other
sports.140 This uncertainty fails, however, to eliminate the popular per-
ception that revenue-producing sports provide financial support for
sports that fail to generate revenues.' 4' What are the consequences of
this perception?
The demographics of African-American student-athletes serve as a
useful point of departure for understanding this perception. African-
American student-athletes are disproportionately represented in the rev-
enue-producing sports. During the 1994-95 academic term, African-
Americans accounted for 50.7 percent and 65.0 percent of football and
basketball players, respectively, in Division I schools.'42 In contrast,
blacks comprise only 5.6 percent of Division I student-athletes in other
men's sports, excluding baseball' 43 and track.1' In short, African-
American males are disproportionately represented in the revenue-pro-
ducing sports.
One possible consequence of this imbalance is real or perceived ex-
ploitation. 45 This perception is based in part on student-athletes' beliefs
140. Considerable disagreement exists regarding the profitability of college sports and
hence the extent to which the revenue-producing sports actually generate revenues for their
institutions. The NCAA's executive director, Cedric Dempsey, asserts that most institutions
are not making money from athletics. Feigen, supra note 44, at 1. According to the NCAA,
figures for 1993 indicate that "one-third of all Division I-A football and Division I men's
basketball programs lose money. The average profit is $3.83 million; the average loss for the
remainder is 1.02 million. Money-making basketball programs in Division I-A reap on aver-
age $1.63 million; the average loss is $226,000." Id.
Others contend that such figures are misleading. Losses often result from mismanagement
(e.g., overly generous travel budgets and higher salaries for athletic department personnel)
and the allocation of revenues generated to upgrade facilities. ErrzEN & SAGE, supra note 20,
at 131. In an exhaustive study of the economics of college sports, Professor Murray Sperber
concluded that although intercollegiate athletics generate big money, most institutions actu-
ally lose money on their programs. MURRAY SPERBER, COLLEGE SPORTS INC.: TE ATm-
LETic DEPARTMENT vs. THE UrvERsrrY 2-3 (1990). This results in large part because as
revenues increase so do athletic department expenditures. Id. at 3, 39.
141. See Ronald D. Mott, Student-Athlete Voices Join Pay for Play Debate, NCAA NEWS,
Sept. 19, 1994, at 1, 19.
This perception was expressed by one student-athlete as follows: "Athletes make their
institutions a lot of money and do not get any benefits." Id.
142. Division I Racial Composition, NCAA NEWS, Jan. 15, 1996, at 2.
143. 7.3 percent of Division I baseball players are black. Id.
144. 28.4 percent of Division I male track athletes are African-American. Id.
145. Smith, supra note 15, at 239 (Lingering bias or racism may underlie the lack of recog-
nition given to this and other differences between revenue-producing and non-revenue pro-
ducing sports).
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW JOURNAL
that their schools derive significant financial rewards from the athletic
services that the former perform. 146 One commentator asserts that this
perception of exploitation arises from the fact that many of the student-
athletes involved in revenue-producing sports are minorities or come
from lower socio-economic backgrounds than student-athletes who typi-
cally participate in the non-revenue-producing sports. 14 7 Contrasting life
experiences may create unique financial and academic support needs by
athletes in the revenue-producing sports. By not using monies generated
by revenue-producing sports to enhance academic support for these stu-
dent-athletes, one commentator argues, is to engage in subtle, and unin-
tended racism. 14 "Taking dollars that are needed to meet the peculiar
academic needs of athletes involved in big-time athletics to support ath-
letes involved in minor sports, therefore, may be Robin Hoodism in re-
verse-taking from the poor and giving to the rich."'1 4 9 The issue
addressed by Professor Smith is illustrated by the University of Kansas.
The basketball television contract and the Big 12 football contract that
Kansas signed allowed it to fund rowing, soccer and other sports.'50 The
failure of NCAA rules to address this imbalance, at a minimum, creates
the appearance of exploitation.' 5'
VI. CONCLUSION
The forgoing discussion is not intended to rationalize student-athlete
violations of rules and regulation. Rather, the principal goal of this essay
is to raise questions concerning the impact of NCAA regulations on the
interests of African-American student-athletes. The primary question is
this: do NCAA rules and regulations impose restrictions on African-
American student-athletes that are overly burdensome to the point of
146. See, e.g., Feigen, supra note 44 (providing illustrations of student-athlete views of
exploitation). One college administrator believes that a way to mitigate the harsh feelings of
exploitation and unfairness held by student-athletes is to emphasize the academic mission of
universities. "The more that collegiate athletes feel like professional sports... the more its
participants will feel unfairly used." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 226. "The galling and insulting thing about exploitation of the student-athlete
is that it occurs primarily on the backs of youngsters, a great majority of them Black. In the
sports that generate revenues for colleges, Blacks are more than 50 percent of the football
players and more than 70 percent of the basketball players." Clark, supra note 44.
149. Id. at 240.
150. Feigen, supra note 44. According to Kansas' athletic director, "I know that at the
University of Kansas, many student-athletes in many sports greatly benefit from the men's
basketball television contract. And there are sports at other institutions in my conference that
benefit from Kansas' success in the Tournament over the years." Id.
151. Smith, supra note 15, at 226, 239-40.
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being unjust?'52 Unfortunately, little has been done to empirically ex-
amine this issue. I suggest that efforts be directed toward studying the
impact of rules intended to preserve the amateurism precept on African-
American student-athletes. Obtaining this information will at least cre-
ate the predicate for a regulatory system that better balances the inter-
ests of institutions and their student-athletes.
152. See Henle, supra note 67, at 60 ("Laws that are too burdensome are unjust").

